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FOREWORD 
This paper stems in part froID; work conducted during the 1969-70 
academic year at the Graduate School of Business Administration, 
Harvard University, and at Marketing Science Institute, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts. 
VERTICAL SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 
B. w. Marion 
Vertical relationships have long been recognized as having a significant 
influence on the behavior and performance of ind11strial organizations. Yet, 
the preponderance of empirical and theoretical work has foc11sed on horizontal 
competitive relationships. At least in part, this may be d11e to the diffic•1lty 
of developing adequate conceptual models of vertical market relationships. 
Altho11gh there have been several recent efforts to improve the concept11al 
models of vertical market systems, vertical systems analysis m11st still be 
considered in the embryonic stage of development. Scholarly contrih1tions 
have provided some useful insights into the characteristics of vertical 
systems, and have contributed to a broader WeltanschalJlmg of economic 
activity. However, one could hardly consider ·that they constitnte a valid 
theory of vertical system behavior. 
Perhaps the key problem in the concept11alization of vertical market 
systems is the interaction of firms at different levels with in a system. The 
paucity of r :search on interorganizational behavior res•1lts in few theoretical 
insights into vertical market relationships. Beca•1se exchange in a vertical 
system often depends in part on negotiation skills, market power, and factors 
in addition to traditional demand and cost fonctions, the models of economics 
only s11ggest a range of possible 011 tcomes. 
Qnlte 11nderstandably, some of the recent inqnlrtes into vertical system 
behavior have attempted to apply concepts from the behavioral sciences. 
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Stern views market channels as social systems involved in performing 
economic fonctions. He contends: 
"Channels can be viewed strictly as economic systems; 
however, s,1ch a perspective also limits knowledge of the 
relationships and interactions within them. The perspective 
m,1st be broadened to incl•1de social and behavioral variables, 
for channels are social systems first and then economic 
systems."! 
Past studies of vertical market systems can be categorized into at 
least three different orientations. 
1. Descriptions and analyses of the physical flow of products, 
the value added and functions performed at different stages, and the 
structure of the industries operating at different stages. This approach 
provides a snapshot of a system at a point in time, bi1t often gives 
little insight into the dynamic properties of a vertical system. 
2. Description and analysis of vertical system coordination, 
incl,1ding the instit•1tions and arrangements involved in comm•inication 
and exchange within the system. Th is_ approach examines one of the 
essent~al dynamic f•inctions of vertical systems, b11t generally ass11mes 
the existing or a hypothetical organization and p•1rpose of the system. 
3. Description and analysis of vertical system adaptation and 
evol11 tion, incl•1d ing the forces of change or inertia. Th is approach is 
longer range in perspective, foc11s ing on a second critical dimension of 
systems -- that of adaption and adj11s.tment. 
1stern, Louis W., Distrib•1tion Channels: Behavioral Dimensions, 
Houghton-Mifflin Co., Boston, Mass., 1969, p. 5. 
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The first approach is a rather straight forward anatomical examination 
of a system, and at least to some extent is req11 ired before the coordination 
or adaptation aspects of the system can be examined. The performance 
of vertical systems, however, are heavily dependent •1pon the efficacy 
with which coordination and adaptation are accomplished. Since both of 
these tasks carry significant behavioral dimensions, let •1s consider some 
of the behavioral concepts that are applicable to vertical system analysis. 
Behavioral Dimensions 
Vertical market systems inherently involve both cooperation and 
conflict. For a vertical complex of organizations to be considered a 
"system 11 , some degree of interdep·endency is req•1 ired. Vertical inter-
dependency, in t•1m, means some commitment to the s11rvival of the 
system and other system members. The level of commitment of system 
members determines the extent to which their individual interests will be 
subordinated to the effectiveness of the total system -- and hence to the 
level of cooperation that will prevail .1 
Wroe Alderson has emphasized the cooperative aspects of market 
systems, contending that a theory of cooperation is needed to accompany 
lsee Wroe Alderson's comments abo11t organized behavior systems 
in Dynamic Marketing Behavior, Richard Irwin, Homewood, Ill., 1965, 
p. 37 - 45. Alderson perceives an oiganized behavior system as a gro11p 
perpetuated by the members' belief that they have more to gain by belonging 
to the group than by independent action. Alderson draws a definite distinct! on 
between an organized behavior system (where each member has a stake in the 
survival of others) and a loose coalition of firms. 
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theories of competition • 1 Baligh and Richartz have commented: 
"The essence, therefore, of any vertical market stf11ct11re 
is the cooperation that m1Jst of necessity exist for exchange 
to occ11r. 112 
Cooperation within vertical systems wo•1ld appear to be partic11larly 
important in contribqting to smooth coordination, and to system eqq ilibri11m. 
Baligh and Richartz s11ggest three req•1isites for system eq11ilibri11m. 
"The first is that every firm within the str11ct11re be incapable 
of changing the cooperative relationships which it has with 
other firms already in the stri1ct11re to its economic advantage ••. 
?econd ••• no firm from witho11t the stri1ct11re finds it possible 
and profitable to alter it by entering into cooperative relation-
ship with those firms already a part of the stf11cti1re •.• Third ... 
that every firm in the stri1cti1re at eq11ilibri•1m performs a 
fonction. 113 
While cooperation is an essential ingredient for system S1Jrvival, 
conflict may be an equally nat11ral -- and perhaps eq11ally important --
dimension of vertical systems. In an interdependent system, the behavior 
of one member frequently threatens the goal satisfaction of other members. 
Conflict res111ts. 
Dahrendorf has contended that, in fact, conflict and change are 
nbiqnito11s in social systems; that eq11ilibri11m models, therefore, provide a 
distorted and incomplete 11nderstanding of system behavior. He comments: 
l Ibid., p. 239. 
2Baligh, Helmy H. and Rlchartz ,· Leon E., Vertical Market Striict,,res, 
Allyn & Bacon, Inc., Boston, Mass., 1969, p. 3. 
3 Ibid., p. 8. 
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"All utopias from Plato's Repqblic to George Orwell's 
Brave New World of 1984 have J:Tad one element of con-
struction in common: they are all societies from which 
change is absent • 
. • . whether by rational arg11ment or empirical analysis, 
it is hard to link the wide river of history -- flowing 
more rapidly at some points, or slowly at others, bit 
always moving -- and the tranq•1il village pond of 11topia . 
• • . at least one other model of society is required. The 
model I have in mind has as long a tradition as the eq11 i-
libri11m (social systems) model. .• th is alternative model 
(is) the "conflict model of society" .•. all 1inits of social 
organization are contin11ously changing, unless some 
force intervenes to arrest this change. It is our task to 
identify the factors interfering with the normal process 
of change rather than to look for variables involved in 
bringing abo11 t change . 
• • • As with change, we have grown accustomed to looking 
for special ca11ses or circ•1mstances whenever we encoqnter 
conflict; but again a complete abo•1t-face is necessary in 
our thinking. Not the presence but the absence of conflict 
is s11rpris ing and abnormal, and we have good reason to be 
sqspicio11s if we find a society or social organization that 
displays no evidence of conflict. To be sq re, we do not 
have to ass11me that conflict is always violent and •incon-
trolled. There is probably a contin•n1m from civil war to 
parliamentary debate, from strikes and locko·1 ts to col-
lective bargaining .•• we m1Jst never lose sight of the ·inder-
lying ass.,mption that conflict c_an be temporarily sqppressed, 
regulated, channeled and controlled, bq t that neither a 
philosopher-king nor a modern dictator can abolish it once 
and for all. 
There is a third notion that goes With change and conflict 
to make qp the armamentari'lm of the conflict model of 
society; the notlon of constraint. From the point of view of 
th is model, societies and social organizations are held 
togethP.r not by consens•1s b•1t by constraint, not by 
qniversal agrP.ement bi1t by coercion of some by others. It 
may be 11sefol for some p11rposes to speak of the "vahe 
system" of a society, h1t in the conflict model sqch 
characteristic values are n1ling rather than common, en-
forced rather than accepted, at any given point in time. 
And, as conflict generates change, so constraint may be 
thought of as generating conflict. 
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••• Because there is no certainty ••• there has to be constraint 
to assure some livable minim11m of coherence. Beca11se we do 
not know all the answers, there-has to be continuo11s conflict 
over values and policies. Because of uncertainty, there is 
always change and development ••• the conflict model ls 
essentially non-11toplan; is the model of an open society ••• 
we need both Qbe equilibri11m and the conflict)models for 
the explanation of sociological problems. Indeed, Lt may 
well be that society, in a philosophical sense, has two 
faces of equal reality; one of stability, harmony, and con-
sensus, and one of change, conflict, and constralnt. 11 1 
While Dahrendorf's comments are aimed at social systems in 
general, they are germane in considering vertical market systems and 
b11siness organizations. One finds, for example, that certain vertical 
systems and firms are characterized by rapid change, conflict and re-
organization. In others -- often where technology is more dormant --
stability, harmony, and efficient organization are dominant featyres. 2 
The comments of Cyert and March strike some similar notes, albeit 
related to organizations. They view an organization as a coalition, b•1 t 
one that naturally embodies some degree of conflict. 
"Basic to the idea of coalition. is the expectation that the 
~ndividual participants ln the organization may have sqbstantially 
different preference orderings (i.e., lndivld11al goals). That is 
to sa", any theory of organizationa·l goals must deal s11ccess-
folly with the obvio11s potential for internal goal conflict 
inherent in a coalition of diverse lndivid11als and gro11ps. 11 3 
lDahrendorf, Ralf, "Essays in the Theory of Society", Stanford University 
Press, Stanford, California, 1968, p. 107, 108, 126 - 128, bracketed phrases 
added. 
2 
For an interesting analysis of the organization and behavior of firms 
ln different types of environments, see Lawrence, P. and Lorsch, I., 
Developing Organlzations: Diagnosis and Action, Addison-Wesley Co., 
Reading, Mass., 1969. 
3cyert, Richard and March, James, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1964, p. 27. 
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It may well be that sufficient similarities exist between intra-
organizational behavior, and the behavior of organizations within a 
vertical system, that studies of the former can provide many 11seful 
insights into the latter. Certainly, at this point in time, theories of 
organizational behavior are farther along in development than theories 
of vertical system behavior. 
Coordination and Adaptation 
Cooperation and conflict are important characteristics of vertical 
systems, not in and of themselves, but because of their effect on system 
coordination and adaptation, and on competition at different levels in a 
system. Coordination is relied upon to integrate and synchronize the 
functional inputs of different system members in order to achieve a 
smoothly functioning whole that effectively ac~ ieves its p11rpose. Adap-
tation reflects the extent to which the system is responsive to its 
environment and adjusts accordingly. Over time, the relevancy and 
s11rvi1,al of the system are at stake. While vohmes have been written 
abo11t comp~tition, the basic nat11re of coordination and adaptation have 
received m11ch less attention. A few comments appear warranted. 
Coordination -- At any given point in time, coordination of a 
vertical system depends upon: 
·existing institutions and arrangements (including markets, 
rules and regulations, trade practices, and facilitating 
organizations) 
·the flow of information (including its acc1iracy, quantity 
and timing) 
.decisions 
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Existing instit•1tions and arrangements are the instruments or the 
vehicles thro11gh which coordination takes place. They have a strong 
influence on the extent to which market signals are acc11rately and 
promptly relayed to system members -- and hence on system respon-
siveness. One of the benefits from contracts, as compared to spot 
markets in linking system members, is the increased information flow 
that often occurs. If the contract is part of a long term continuous 
relationship, higher levels of cooperation and 11nderstandlng might 
also be expected, although th is depends 11pon the degree of dependency 
of each party on the other. 
Given the institi1tions and arrangements and flow of information in 
the system, management decisions actually perform the coordinating task. 
In this respect, the concept of a system "decision anatomy" may be 
analytically usefol. The dee is ion anatomy refers to the network of 
decision points and associated authority extending througho'lt the system. 
It rep.esents the 11 nervo11s system 11 by which coordination and adj11stments 
take place. 1 
The decision anatomy of a system provides an overall view of the 
control points and the distribution of authority and influence for the 
entire system. Few decisions are made at the system level, however. 
lFor forther comments on th is approach, see Henry B. Arthur, et al, 
Tropical Agribqsiness Systems: Bananas, Division of Research, Grad•1ate 
School of B•1siness Administration, Harvard University, 1969, Chapter 7; 
also Marion and Arthur, 11 Dynamic Factors in Vertical Commodity Complexes: 
A Case Study of the Broiler Indus try 11 , forthcoming research bulletin, Ohio 
Agricultural Research & Development Center, Wooster, Ohio. 
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Rather, decisions are made by individuals and groups of individuals as 
they perform certain roles within the firms and organizations that make 
up the system. Thus, the structure of authority and decisions within the 
organizations in the system also have a bearing of coordinating decisions. 
Lawrence and Lorsch found, for example, that firms facing rapidly changing 
and uncertain environments need to have a relatively flat organizational 
structure in which considerable authority and freedom is delegated to 
lower levels. On the other hand, firms in a relatively unchanging environmen1 
can operate with less delegation, tighter internal controls and simpler 
channels of communication . 1 Since an organization must carry on trans-
actions with its environment simply to survive, the characteristics of 
the organization need to be consistent with the various segments of the 
environments with which it deals. 
The foregoing suggests the importance of understanding the 
distribution of authority and decisions within a system. Attempting to 
understand why certain decisions are made requires examining yet 
another di nension -- the set of forces b,earing on decision makers. These 
include: competitive forces, the goals and values of individuals and 
organizations, their perceived role and power in the system, economic-
political-social forces, etc. Both the forces and the interpretation of 
them may change from one decision point to another. The greater the 
1Lawrence and Lorsch, Developing Organizations •••• , op. cit. 
Page 10 
difference in the set of forces bearing on decision makers at different 
levels in the system, the more difftcq it the integration and coordination 
task. 
Adaptation 
Vertical systems are generally evolving systems, as opposed to 
steady state systems. They are continqally adj'] sting and adapting to 
pressures and imbalances emanating from horizontal competition, vertical 
conflict, and environmental forces. This is not to s11ggest, however, that 
all vertical systems are eq11ally responsive and adaptive. Qq ite clearly, 
history s•iggests that this is not so. 
The factors tnflqencing a system's adaptability are open to 
conjecture. McCammon has sqggested: 
" ••• instit11tional change in marketing tends to be a process 
ln which firms and channels mane•1ver for short-r•in advantage 
and in which they adapt almost imperceptibly to environmental 
disturbances. u l 
Since members of established vertical systems often resist or 
respond only incrementally to innovations, major innovations -- partic'l larly 
those that threaten to restf11ctqre the system -- are generally introd•1ced 
by firms completely outside the system. Relatively free entry wo11ld 
therefore appear to he important to sys tern adaptability. 
!McCammon, Bert C. Jr., "Alternative Explanations of Instit'ltional 
Change and Channel Evolntion", in The Marketing Channel: A Concept11al 
Viewpoint, ed. by Bn1ce Mallen, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1969. 
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The st1"11ctnre and control of the vertical system amy also infl11ence 
its responsiveness and adaptability. Xltho11gh empirical data are lacking, 
one might hypothesize that the accqracy with which cons11mer preferences 
are transmitted (and hence the possibility that system adjqstments will be 
relevant} improves when retail 01Jtlets are organized (so they have some 
power in the market place), are free of significant man•1facb1rer control, 
and handle the prod•1cts of several manqfact•irers, as compared to the 
opposite extreme of manqfactnrer owned and controlled retail oqtlets. 
In addition, logic sqggests other infhences on system respon-
siveness, snch as the presence of innovative firms at different levels 
in a system to set the pace for others, the growth-matqrity stage of 
the system, the existence of government g•1arantees or other shields 
from market forces, and the balance of conflict and cooperation in the 
system. 
Performance of Vertical Systems 
11 011r perspective of (system) performance may be that of a 
critic evaluating the system in the light of its contrlh1tions 
to sor.iety or that of the individ11al entreprene11r seeking to 
Sqrvive and prosper within the system. 11 l 
In either case, however, one enco11nters the dilemma of whose 
goals are to be cho~en, and how are they to be aggregated. Steamlined, 
efficient and tightly coordinated systems are des ireable, as are innovative, 
adaptive and responsive systems. But, can both types of performance be 
realized in the same system? There is no clear answer. It seems likely 
lsucklln, Louis P., ed., Vertical Marketing Systems, Scott, Foresman 
& Co., Glenview, Illinois, 1970, p.3. 
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that both sets of system characteristics are present to some degree 
in all systems. However, the balance varies greatly. In discussing 
market organization and economic development, Preston suggests: 
11 
•••• the evaluation of marketing-organization alternatives in 
the development context requires consideration of the informational, 
adaptive, and innovational functions of marketing agencies as 
well as their routine distribution of staple product lines. The 
most efficient organizational patterns for distributing standard 
products to existing markets are probably the least dfsireable 
ones for rapid and imaginative market development." 
In studying the U. S. food industries, Handy and Padberg 
found that two parallel vertical systems are emerging. 2 One of these 
links core manufacturers and fringe retailers in a system that emphasizes 
product progressiveness and non-price competition. National brands 
and in-store merchandising and service are primary competitive weapons. 
The second system links core distributors with fringe manufacturers 
in a system emphasizes physical efficiency and economy. Private labels 
and low prices are important competitive weapons. 
While such parallel system are not developed for all products, for 
the large majority of products handled in supermarkets, they are. From 
a performance standpoint, this arrangement results in consumers having 
greater choice in the market place, and benefit ing from both product 
1Preston, Lee, 11 Market Organi:Zation and Economic Development: 
Structure, Product3 and Management", in Vertical Marketing Systems, 
op. cit., p. 133. 
2Handy, C.R. and Padberg, D. E. , "A Model of Competitive 
Behavior in Food Industries 11 , American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 
May 1971. 
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progres-siveness and product economy. While core distribt1tors and core 
manufacturers contin•1e to deal with one another, their interdependency 
has likely declined. Direct confrontations between the two loc11ses of 
power are largely avoided. 
One of the important factors leading to the development of 
parallel systems has been the development of a distrib!1tion oligopoly 
in food. Without q•1estion, the large core distribt1tors are the captains 
of the private label vertical systems. In industries where distrih1tion 
oligopolies have not developed, private label economy-oriented vertical 
systems have generally not developed to the same extent as in the food 
industries. 
In this case, it appears that ·one vertical system could not perform 
equally well, considering both prod•1ct progressiveness and economy 
dimensions of performance; and that different performance criteria are 
warranted in evaluating the two parallel systems. 
While at this point, the opportunities for the development of 
similar parallel systems in other industries is not clear, the food 
industry model does suggest that expecting a given vertical system to 
be both progressive in developing new prod•1cts and highly efficient 
may be unrealistic. Perhaps the more realistic approach ls to evaluate 
systems in terms of their primary performance characteristic, and 
encourage the development of alternative systems that specialize in 
providing other desired aspects of performance. 
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In recent years, planned vertical systems have become more numero11s . 
Large retailers such as Sears and Kro~er now control significant portions of 
their S•1pply networks through ownership, joint-vent11res or contracts. 
Kentucky Fried Chicken, the nation's largest fried chicken company, now 
operates its own vertically integrated broiler growing and processing system. 
Some of the motel chains, such as Holiday Inn, have integrated vertically 
into industries supplying them. 
In many cases, planned vertical systems have also stemmed from 
the initiative of manufacturers. For example, tire, paint, clothing and 
dairy manufacturing companies have developed chains of retail 0•1tlets to 
distribute their products. 
McCammon suggests that there are three basic types of planned 
1 
vertical sys terns • 
1. Corporate -- based upon vertical ownership 
2. Administered -- coordination is achieved by programs developed 
by one or more firms; d_epends •1pon exercise of economic 
and political power. 
3. Contractual -- based •1pon some type of vol•intary or cooperative 
contractual relationship. · 
McCammon contends that planned systems approach peak efficiency 
quicker than vertical systems that gradually evolve. This may well be 
tf11e in that the coordinator of s11ch systems has greater aqthority and 
power to stim•1late afficiency. The fong riin effect of planned systems 
1 McCammon, Bert C., Jr., "System Management", in Vertical 
Marketing Systems, op. cit. 
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on competitive intensity, responsiveness to cons•1mers, innovateness, 
equity and other performance dimensions is s11bject to greater debate. 
While data are lacking, one might S1Jspect that while planned systems 
become tightly coordinated, efficient vertical systems more q11ickly than 
11nplanned systems, they may also be more rigid systems (particqlarly 
corporate types of planned systems) which over time enco•1nter problems 
of adaptability and responsiveness. 
In planned systems based •Jpon contractual relationships, some 
members of the systems may find themselves locked into a satellite 
relationship with the system "captain 11 • Such positions of extreme 
dependency may be desireable for both entities as long as the marriage 
lasts. They may, however, impede warranted divorces, and most 
certainly pose serious hard.ships on the satellite firm if the relationship 
is abr11ptly ended. 
These comments are largely speculative in nature due to the absence 
of analyses of planned vertical systems. It might well be fri1itfql to 
examine thE behavioral dimensions of different types of vertical systems. 
For example, are planned systems characterized by higher levels of 
cooperation, as one would expect? Or, in planned systems where power 
is used to obtain cooperation, is there considerable conflict that is present 
but constrained? Is a certain amount of conflict necessary to stim11late 
progressiveness and adaptability? 
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In discussing social systems, Bertram Gross states: 
"Conflict among and within sygtems is probably the greatest 
source of continuing change ••• The common interests and goals 
that keep a system together are always embedded in a network 
of divergent and competing interests and goals .•• Some degree 
of conflict -- both internal and external -- is an essential 
stimulus to system adaptability and creativity ... 1 
System performance may be enhanced by moderate levels of both 
conflict and cooperation. Extreme levels of either, on the other hand, 
may be dysfunctional or unhealthy for the system. Th•1s, there may be 
a socially desireable balance of these two forces. 
The interrelationship of cooperation-conflict and market struct•lfe, 
growth rate, new technology, market rules, and the nature of competition 
needs further examination to allow possible •1se of the cooperation-conflict 
idea. It seems entirely reasonable that the intensity of horizontal compe-
tition in a system may inf111ence or be influenced by the balance of conflict 
and cooperation with in the system. For example, a firm facing intense 
competition may place greater pressur~ on its s•1ppliers, prod•1cing in t•1m 
greater conflict vertically. The dynamics of these relationships are not 
well •mderstood but warrant additional examination. 
Stem suggests measuring the performance of firms in a three-
dimensional space of competition, conflict and cooperation, based upon 
the perceptions of uther firms in the vertical system or at the same level 
lGross, Bertram, "The State of the Nation: Social Systems Accounting" 
in Social Indicators, op. cit., p. 176, 177. 
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in the system. I Similarly, an index of conflict-cooperation mlght be 
developed for vertical systems based 11pon the perceptions of inp11t 
s11ppliers who sezvice several vertical sys terns and hence have some 
bas is for comparison. 
If, in fact, conflict and cooperation can be measured, then the 
factors influencing them become eligible for analysis. Regardless of the 
soundness of the hypotheses concerning conflict and cooperation, their 
usefulness by policy makers is likely to depend 11pon identification of 
the factors affecting the conflict-cooperation balance. I.e., what factors, 
over which the p11blic sector has some control, infhence conflict and 
cooperation? F·1rther, what are the interrelationships between conflict, 
cooperation, competition and system coordination and adaptabllity? As 
the dynamics of vertical systems receive further attention, these are 
some of the critical q11estions needing an answer. 
Yet another behavioral dimension -- power -- has an important 
bearing on the conduct and performance of vertica 1 market sys terns . As 
Palamountain has s11ggested: 
"It is apparent that a principal factor differentiating vertical 
conflict from horizontal or intertype competition is that it is so 
directly a power conflict. 11 2 
1stem, Louis W., "Antitr11st Implications of A Sociological Interpretation 
of Competition, Conflict, and Cooperation in the Marketplace", The Antitri1st 
B11lletin, Fall 1971. 
2Palamo1intain, Joseph C. Jr., ''Vertical Conflict", in Lon is W. Stem, 
Distribqtion Channels ••• , op. cit., p. 135. 
Page 18 
Economists have long been concerned about certain aspects of power, 
such as "monopoly power", "market power", and "bargaining power". 
However, these seldom embrace the total significance of power in vertical 
market systems. It is to this topic that we now direct our attention. 
The Dynamics of Power 
Power is defined by Emerson in terms of the dependence of one 
actor upon another actor. 
"The dependence of actor P 1 pon actor 0 is (1) directly 
proportional to P's motivational investment in goals mediated 
by 0, and (2) inversely proportional to the availability of 
those goals to P outside of the 0 - P relation. n l 
The power of 0 is thus dependent upon P's perception of O's ability 
to satisfy or inhibit P's desires and the number of alternatives perceived 
by P. This general definition can be applied to power in the marketplace, 
in the political arena, or in society in general. 
It is important to recognize explicitly that one of the prime concerns 
of public policy is the acquisition and· concentration of power in vario•1s 
forms, not only "market power". This concern is evident in the following 
comment by Attorney General John N. Mitchell in 1969: 
"In 1948, the nation's 200 largest ind•1strial corporations 
controlled 48 percent of the manufacturing assets. Today, 
these firms control 58 percent, while the top 500 firms control 
75 percent of these assets. 
The danger that this super-concentration poses to our 
economic, political and social str•1ct•1re cannot be over-
estimated. 11 2 
1Emerson, Richard, "Power-Dependence Relations", American Sociological 
Review, February 1962, p. 32-33. 
2Mintz, Morton and Cohen, Jerry, America Inc., The Dial Press, N.Y. 1971, 
p. 16. 
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and ln Senator Gaylord Nelson's statement, also in 1969: 
"Americans, ever suspicious of concentrated politlcal 
power, have permitted concentrations of economic power 
to develop, substantialll unchallenged, that would make 
a Roman emperor gasp." 
From a public policy standpoint, the existence of power is of concern, 
whether or not it is used or misused. The very existence of power carries 
with it the potential for socially detrimental influence, and hence is a 
legitimate concern in a democratic society. As Mintz and Cohen s11ggest: 
"It is the potential that is of foremost concern. The environ-
ment always to be sought is one which ass11res that ordinary 
men, not merely heroes, will reliably do what is necessary. 11 2 
Stern suggests that there are five bases of power in vertical market 
systems. These include rewards, coercion, expertness, legitimacy, and 
identification or referent power. 3 The first two, rewards and coercion 
power, are closely related and are similar to the gain and pain bargaining 
power suggested by some authors. These are the bases of power that are 
the most explosive, and most likely to generate conflict and reaction from 
other members of the system. In some cases, the exercise of reward or 
coercion power may stimulate efforts to countervail or neutralize such power. 
Galbraith suggests that it ls natural for the weaker members of a power dyad 
1 Ibid. I p . 18 . 
2Ibid • I p • 2 7 • 
3stern, Louis, Distribution Channels, op. cit., p. 95. 
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to attempt to equalize the power relationship. 1 This may be achieved by 
forming coalitions, or by altering the dependency relationships. 
Power is obviously a relative force. A firm may have considerable 
power in dealing with some suppliers, for example, but little power in 
dealing with others. 
It is also well to distinguish between potential and realized power. 
For example, markets structure variables in certain combinations do represent 
potential sources of power in the market place. Whether in fact such power 
is realized depend upon whether it is offset or m•1ted in some way. 
Power is frequently viewed in a negative, exploitive sense. However, 
as Stern suggests: 
"Power can be used to break down resistance to change, 
depending on the domain, weight, and scope of the power 
held by the agent seeking change, and to serve as a means 
for coordinating the efforts of all participants in the channel. 11 2 
In a similar vein, power may have a positive inf1•1ence on system 
coordination by resolving conflict and- stimulating greater committment to 
and cooperation with a particular vertical system. Parson suggests that, 
in fact, power may be necessary for an ind•1strial society to function. 3 
Assessing the magnitude and distribution of power in a vertical 
system is a difficult task that, to the author's knowledge, has not been 
lGalbraith, John K., American Capitalism, Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 
Massachusetts, 1956. 
2stern, Louis, Distribution Channels ••• , op. cit., p. 113. 
3parson, Talcott, "The Distribution of Power in American Society", in 
C. Wright Mills And The Power Elite, compiled by G. Wm. Domhoff and Hoyt B. 
Ballard, Beacon Press, Boston, Massachusetts, 1968. 
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attempted in a rigorous and systematic fashion. Because of the Robinson-
Patman Act, prices will frequently not reflect the distribution of power in a 
system. The distribution of risk within a vertical system often provides 
some insights into the distribution of power. The patterns of credit and 
financing, and the various services rendered may also provide some cl11es. 
Because power is largely a perceived force, the possiblity exists 
to measure the magnit11de and distribi1tion of power as perceived by members 
of a system. While s11ch an approach has been 11sed to meas•1re perceived 
power in some spheres, it has not as yet been attempted to st1Jdy power 
in a vertical market sys tern. 
The Transience of Power -- Altho•1gh relatively little is understood 
abo11t the dynamics of power, a few comments are appropriate. Monopoly 
power has frequently been viewed by economis_ts as q11asi-permanent. Yet, 
it appears there are strong forces that continually erode existing positions 
of power. These include: 
1 - The life cycle effect on product differentiation 
2 - Increasing rate of technological change 
3 - The difficulty of avoiding "organizational slack" in a firm with 
considerable market power 
4 - Increasing willingness and ability of firms to enter qnfamiliar 
industries; i.e., the number of potential entrants has increased 
5 - The tendency for countervailing power to develop to offset or 
mute exis ~ing power 
6 - Increasing competition from imports in many ind•1stries 
The existence of a life cycle for many prod11cts means a grad11al 
decline in product differentiation in the maturity stage, freqqently accom-
panted by the increased importance of private labels. Th is phenomenon also 
stimulates the development and introd'lction of new products, which in tum 
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may shorten the life of older products. The impact of the life cycle on 
different ind11stries varies greatly, however. Positions of monopoly 
power sho11ld be of greater concern in relatively stable, slowly changing 
industries, than in those where rapid changes and short life cycles prevail. 
The increasing rate of technological change represents another 
threat to established positions of power. Changes in process , management, 
and/or product technology often provide opportunities for new entrants or 
smaller firms to successfully challenge and compete with established 
firms in an industry. Th is is particularly tri1e where new technology 
makes obsolete large investments of existing firms. Existing firms may be 
understandably reluctant to "write off" former investments unless they are 
forced to by an aggressive innovator. Low entry barriers are obviously 
important for th is to occqr. 
One of the frequent results of market power is a red11ction of •incer-
tainty and risk. Th11s, a firm with considerable market power is likely to 
experionce less anxiety and stress. The atmosphere of a relaxed firm, 
however, m~y allow a certain amoiint of o_rganizational slack -- which in 
time may res111t in the erosion of its power base. 
The grcwth of conglomerates, the expansion of technical competence 
in many firms, and the vent11resomeness of the new breed of entreprene1Jrs 
has eliminated much of the hesitancy of firms to enter new and •infamiliar 
industries. This force alone has had a marked impact on the security and 
contentedness of many ''old line" firms with established positions in certain 
industries. 
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The extent to which power tends to be neutralized, offset, or muted 
is unknown. It is apparent in certain situations, such as the growth of 
unions, the increase in farmer bargaining, the development of black power, 
student power and consumer power, and the development and growth of 
farmer cooperatives and retailer b11ying organizations. A firm's location 
within the marketing channel and the characteristics of the channel influence 
the extent to which power is offset. In those systems where the retail 
distribi1tor is closely tied to the manufact11rer as far as prod11cts handled 
(the petroleum and automobile systems, for example), the power of the 
retail distributor is likely to be less than where distrib11tors handle the 
prod11ct lines of many man11facturers and are essentially independent in 
their operations. In food retailing, for example, where the prod•1cts of 
many vertical systems are handled (incl11ding private labels), retail firms 
can be relatively independent in dealing with manqfactqrers. Thqs, even 
though several food processing or man•1facturing ind•1stries are differentiated 
oligopolies, their power tends to be muted by large retail organizations. 
The fo .. egoing forces cause a continual shift in the bases of power. 
They do not necessarily cause a resh11ffling or redistrib11tion of power, 
however. If, as Averitt suggests, many large firms have a g 11idance system 
that is "locked on" to product and technology changes that represent growth 
opportnnities, they may be s•1ccessf111 in contin•1ally refortifying th is 
aspect of their power position. It wo11 ld appear that large firms sho·1 ld be 
more adept at playing the game of m11sical chairs for shifting so11rces of 
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power than most smaller firms because of the former's longer riin orientation 
and strong emphasis on growth. 
The prevalence of countervailing power as a socially beneficial 
balancing force is subject to debate. Ralph Nader, in his introd•1ction 
to America, Inc. states: 
11 D11ring the past generation, a new theory of self-correcting 
mechanisms--coiintervailing powers or economic phralism--
gained acceptance. One power bloc, it is said, s11bstantially 
c11rbs the excesses of another power bloc, whether they be 
big sellers, big bqyers, big •inions, big government, or the 
collective feedback of 111timate consumers • 
• • • Di1ring the past six years, the realities of the corporate 
condition have beg•in to spill into the public domain .•. Co11nter-
vailing power t11rns out to be mostly an accommodating power 
which transfers the resqlts of corporate ab1Jses from one point 
on the market or the environmental or governmental contin'l11m 
qntil they land on the point o.f least resistence--the consumer-
c i tizen -taxpayer. 11 l 
In commenting on the resilience and end•irance of corporations, Nader 
strongly suggests that they are largely imm•1ne to the above transient 
dimensions of power. 
"The management of power in a complex society is b•1ilt 
around institi1tions. In our country, the most end 11ring, 
coordinated and generic manager of. power is the corporate 
institi1tion. Controlling great we:alth and metabolized by 
the most fungible of factors--the dollar--the modern corporation 
possesses a formidable unity of motivation and action with 
great stamina. 
Historicall:•, many of 0•1r coiintry's str'lggles have been 
challenges of the corporate power to define the area of its 
accountability. This was tfl1e of the Populist and Progressive 
movements as well as the challenges of organized labor and 
the reg11lator1 state of the New Deal. Against these and lesser 
b•1ffetings, the corporation, with its peerless resiliency of 
bending now and consolidating later, prevailed only to increase 
its power. n 2 
!Mintz & Cohen, America, Inc., op. cit., p. 'J0J. 
2Ibld. , p. xi and xii. 
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Market rules have an important influence on the transience and 
distribution of power. Tax laws, anti-trust statutes, legislation on 
information that must be provided to consumers -- these and many other 
"market rules" influence the dynamics of power. An important vehicle 
by wh lch large corporations maintain and increase their power ls the 
corporate merger. The stance of federal regulatory agencies on mergers 
involving large companies can have a significant infl•1ence on the trends 
of power concentration over time, and on the extent to which power is 
actually transient. 
Power In A Broader Sense -- The dangers or deslreabilltles of 
concentrated economic power depend upon an assessment of power and 
its influence in the greater society. Because of the obtruse nat11re of 
"power", solid empirical data is extremely difficult to obtain. Most 
analyses of power are thus a combination of the author's hypotheses 
with bits and pieces of supporting c.ircumstantial evidence. 
There are two bas le concepts of power ln the U.S. , the elitls ts 
and plurali1ts. Since their difference suggest some of the key lss•1es 
concerning power, they warrant comment. 
Elitists -- C. Wright Mills was one of the leading proponents of 
the elitist point of view . 1 Mills' central proposition is that power has 
become increasingly concentrated in the U .s.; that a "power elite" made 
1For a compilation of several critiques and commentaries on Mills' 
work, see C, Wright Mills And The Power Elite, compiled by G. Wm. Domhoff 
&HoytB. Ballard, Beacon Press, Boston, Massachusetts, 1968. 
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up of a relatively small, tightly integrated group of people occupying the 
command posts of large organizations (corporate, political and military) 
control nearly all the important decisions; and that below the power elite 
are a middle power group -- made up of diversified interest groups, and 
the "mass society" -- a powerless mass of unorganized people controlled 
from above. 
Pluralists -- As reflected in David Riesman's 11The Lonely Crowd 11 
{Doubleday Anchor, 1953), the pluralist point of view holds that no single 
unified power gronp exists in the U. S. Instead of£. "power elite", the 
pluralists perceive a number of amorphous special interest or 11veto 11 gro•1ps, 
each concerned with protecting their particular interests .1 The presence of 
mnltiple centers of power provides one of the important restraints on power. 
In fact, Riesman warns that power may become so fragmented that effective 
leadership cannot emerge. 
The implications of these two points of view are radically different. 
The elitist carry a strong concern for the exploitive and manipulative effect 
of concentr<'1ted power that, in their mindi;;, is largely unconstrained. The 
pluralists, on the other hand, feel that power is effectively constrained for 
the most part, and therefore hold much less fear of its detrimental effects. 
One of the critical issues in this debate is the relationship between 
large corporations, the very rich, and the body politic. Available data 
indicate that wealth is highly concentrated in the U .s. with no apparent 
1 lb id o I P o 3 7 - 5 9 • 
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trend toward deconcentration. There is also a strong ownership link between 
the very rich and large corporations. ln 1953, the wealthiest 1 percent of the 
adult population held 76 percent of the corporate stock. 1 Whether, in fact, 
this means that the very rich effectively control most corporations in the U .s. 
is debateable. Parsons, Bell and others have argued that the control of 
business has passed into the hands of professional executives who have 
reached their positions thro11gh means other than the exercise of property 
rights. Bell contends that the death of family capitalism and the rise of 
managerial capitalism has meant that the keys to power have shifted from 
wealth to education, technical skill and political position. 2 
Domhoff challenges this contention. Drawing from his book, Who R11les 
America ?3, he states: 
11 
.•• This study showed that the less-than-one-percent who 
make up the American upper class contri~ute anywhere from 25 
percent to 62 percent of the directors and partners of the larg-
est banks, law firms, and corporations, and that these men and 
their hired employees dominate the philanthropic fo1mdations, 
the boards of trustees of leading universities, the largest opinion-
forming associations, the largest of the mass media, and the 
exec11tive branch of the federal government. Two of the most 
important findings of Who R11les America? concerned the relation-
ship Letween the old-line members.of the 11pper class and the 
control of the corporate economy. On the one hand, it is clear 
that many members of the qpper class contin 1 e to acq•1ire the 
expertise necessary to f•inction in the complex world of modem 
l 11Estate-Tax Increases Get Little Support", The Christian Science 
Monitor, June, 1971. Also see Herman Miller, Rich Man, Poor Man, Signet 
Books, New York, 19 64. 
2Domhoff and Ballard, C. Wright Mills ... , op. cit., p. 60-88, 251-278. 
3Domhoff, G. Wm., Who Rqles America?, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey, 1967. 
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corporations and law flnns. On the other hand, it is clear that 
rising executives are assimilated into the social institutions of 
the upper class ••• 11 l 
A related issue, particularly in recent years, is the extent to which 
large financial organizations -- which may be largely controlled by the 
upper class -- also influence or control other corporate entities. Discussing 
the situation in banking, America, Inc. states: 
11 
••• the S1Jbcommittee on Domestic Finance of the House 
Committee on Banking and C•1rrency ••• found that in 1967 
institutional investors held $1 trillion in assets. Of this 
sum, $607 billion, or 60 percent, was held by the tri1st 
departments of the forty-nine commercial banks which the 
staff surveyed ••• Together, ••• the forty-nine banks in the 
survey held at least five percent of the common stock of 
each of 147 of the 500 largest indqstrial corporations. The 
same banks had a total of 768 interlocking directorships with 
286 of the 500 largest corporations, or 'an average of almost 
three directors for each corporation board on which bank 
director representation is fo•md'. 11 2 
Regarding concentration of power thro11gh newspapers, th is same 
source notes that in 1910, 57 percent of the nation's cities and towns 
had daily newspapers under two or more separate ownerships. By 1970, 
this hud dropped to 4 percent. In 1970, there were l, 483 cities with 
monopoly ownerships, compared to 64 with competing ownerships. 3 
Further, a growing number of newspapers, radio stations and television 
stations are owned by conglomerate industrial and business corporations. 
lnomhoff, G. Wm., 11The Power Elite and Its Critics", in C. Wright 
Mills ••• , op. cit., p. 269. 
2Mintz and Cohen, America, Inc., op. cit., p. 19, 20. 
3Ibid. I p. 96. 
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The possibilities for conflicts of interest and incomplete reporting are 
thereby increased. 
Even if we accept the implications of the above evidence indicating 
a broad swath of influence and power by individuals with wealth and/or 
corporate leadership, this still does not mean that these individuals are 
unified in some sense so that they operate as an elite group. Floyd H•inter's 
study indicated that many of the individ•1als identified as top leaders in the 
U .s. were personal acquaintances of several other top leaders .1 That 
interaction occurs among these men is not particularly surprising. What is 
not known is whether this results in their acting with some degree of •mity 
on major decisions. Pluralists contend that no s•1ch 'lnity exists -- that 
in fact competition, not conspiracy, takes place between elites. Mills 
argued that the structural trends of society, similar socio-economic statiis, 
and similar psychological experiences in large institi1tions all formed the 
basis for 1mity. Without more eviden~e to go on, it is difficult to joidge 
who is right. 
Too little is known about the total impact, interrelationships and 
influence of economic power. The previous discussion has attempted to 
point out some of the key issues regarding power, and to draw attention to 
the caution flags heing waved in certain quarters. Some will greet s•1ch 
comments concerning growing economic and political power as overexag-
gerations and unduly alarming. However, the potential detrimental effect 
lHunter, Floyd, Top Leadership, USA, University of North Carolina 
Press, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1959. 
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on the U.S. economic, political and social systems is too great to justify 
dismissing these concerns lightly. On an issue such as this, the dangers 
from erring on the side of too great a concern appear far less than erring 
in the opposite direction. 
Frequently, discussions of market structure focus solely on the 
implications for economic performance; yet, the power implications --
economic, political, and social -- are an •mderlying concern of many 
policy decisions. While a difficult and somewhat sensitive subject, 
more explicit consideration of power seems warranted in most studies 
of market, ind11stry or system performance. 
Concluding Comments: Vertical Sy.stems Analysis 
These comments have cast vertical market systems as evolving, 
interdependent social and economic systems that both influence and are 
influenced by the broader environment in which they are embedded. No 
adequate theory exists of vertical systems -- cast in this light. 
In view of this, the foregoing disc•1ssion has attempted to s•1mmarize 
some of the concepts and hypotheses concerning vertical system behavior. 
The behavioral dimensions of conflict, cooperation and power were discussed 
at some length, du0 to their perceived strong influence on system coordination 
and adaptation. Some of the broader aspects of the power issue were also 
included because of the postulated interrelationships between economic, 
political and social power. 
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Relatively little empirical work has focused on the behavioral dimensions 
of vertical market systems. In view of this, while many intrlg11lng hypotheses 
can be foIWarded, few have been verified or refuted at this point. Hopefolly, 
some of the more germane questions and issues have been identified in this 
discussion. 
Although the present state of the arts of vertical systems analysis is 
rather bleak, the conceptual approach remains extremely attractive. Adopting 
the perspective of vertical systems as evolving, interdependent social and 
economic system stretches one beyond the structure of industries or the 
logistics-physical transformation focus of some analysts. It encourages 
consideration of both horizontal competitive relationships and vertical 
relationships; of the market rules and institutions that lnf1•1ence system 
behavior as well as the structure and conduct of corporate entitles; of system 
adaptation and evolution as well as the efficiency and coordination of an 
existing system; and of behavioral forces as well as economic forces and 
relationships. Thus, the Weltanscha•rn ing it suggests is much broader 
and more realistic. Whether, in fact, it. is so broad and complex as to 
defy rigorous and definitive analysis remains to be seen. 
